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grossly negligent. The court held that 
once it was established that Liscombe was 
contributorily negligent as a matter oflaw 
it was up to Liscombe to prove gross negli-
gence on the part of the defendants. Evi-
dence at trial showed that the defendants 
were aware of the dangerous position of 
the overhead lines, because one month be-
fore a similar, less serious, accident oc-
curred. However, the court found that 
Potomac and Hagerstown acted reasonably 
in trying to prevent further accidents. The 
evidence showed red flags had been hung 
from the wires, oral warnings were given 
to all trucks entering the plant, and Po-
tomac had staked out a new route for the 
wires. After an examination of the facts, 
the court found the defendants acted rea-
sonably under the situation and were not 
guilty of gross negligence. 
The court dismissed Liscombe's last ar-
gument, that the issue oflast clear chance 
should have been left for the jury, by hold-
ing the doctrine inapplicable in this case. 
The court, citing Sanner v. Suard, 236 
Md. 271, 203 A.2d 885 (1964), held that 
in Maryland the last clear chance doctrine 
has no application when the negligence of 
the plaintiff is concurrent with the negli-
gence of the defendant, and the defendant 
had no opportunity to avoid the accident 
after the original negligence. In the case at 
bar no such opportunity was afforded to 
the defendants. 
The court of appeals' decision in Lis-
combe v. Potomac Edison Co. reaffirms the 
Maryland judiciary's position that a plain-
tiff guilty of negligence, however slight, is 
completely barred from recovery. The 
burden placed upon the defendant in elec-
trical shock cases is slight. In the absence 
of wanton or reckless conduct on the part 
of the defendant, a person who knew or 
should have known that a wire is danger-
ous, and puts himself close enough to it to 
receive a shock, is contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law and is thus barred from 
recovery. 
-Stephen Markey 
American Federation of State, 
County, and Munidpal Employees v. 
State of Washington: NINTH 
CIRCUIT REJECTS COMPARABLE 
WORTH 
In American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees v. State of Wash-
ington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the state's decision 
to base compensation on the competitive 
market rather than on a theory of com-
parable worth did not establish its liability 
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under a disparate impact analysis. The 
court held that the state's participation in 
the market system did not allow the infer-
ence of discriminatory motive so as to es-
tablish its liability under a disparate treat-
ment theory, since the state did not create 
the market disparity and was not shown to 
have been motivated by impermissible sex-
based considerations in setting salaries. 
The State of Washington was sued in the 
United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington by two unions: 
the American Federation of State, County, 
and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME), and 
the Washington Federation of State Em-
ployees, (WFSE), on behalf of a class of 
15,500 state employees who work or have 
worked in jobs consisting of at least seventy 
percent female employees. The district 
court found that the state discriminated on 
the basis of sex by compensating employees 
in predominately female jobs at lower rates 
than employees in predominately male 
jobs, where the jobs were found to be al-
though dissimilar, of comparable worth to 
the employer. The district court found 
Washington State in violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 200e-2(a) (1982). 
The State of Washington sets its em-
ployee salaries at rates comparable to the 
prevailing market rates in the public and 
private sectors. Market rates are deter-
mined by a process of surveys, hearings, 
and state budget analyses. In 1974, the 
state conducted a wage disparity study en-
titled "The Willis Study" which found a 
wage disparity of about twenty percent to 
the disadvantage of employees in jobs held 
predominately by women for jobs of com-
parable worth held predominately by men. 
Comparable worth was determined by a 
four-prong test: knowledge and skills, men-
tal demands, accountability, and working 
conditions. Similar surveys were con-
ducted in 1976 and 1980. In 1983, the 
state adopted a ten-year plan to correct the 
disparity. 
The district court ordered immediate 
implementation of a system of compensa-
tion based on comparable worth as well as 
back pay. The district court based its de-
termination of sex discrimination on two 
theories: disparate impact and dispa~ate 
treatment. Disparate impact discrimina-
tion involves a facially neutral employ-
ment practice that, without business justi-
fication, has a disproportionately adverse 
impact upon members of a group protected 
under Title VII. Proof of intent is not re-
quired, because, where a practice is spe-
cific and focused, the question is whether 
the employer's explanation for the com-
pensation policy reveals that it is a pretext 
for discrimination. For disparate treat-
ment analysis, discriminatory intent is an 
essential element. Under the disparate 
treatment theory, to establish intent, it is 
insufficient for the plaintiff to show that 
the employer was merely aware of the ad-
verse consequences of a compensation pol-
icy. The plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer chose the policy, at least partly, 
because of its adverse effects. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's finding of liability under 
both the disparate impact and disparate 
treatment theories. The court stated that 
Washington's decision to base compensa-
tion on the competitive market, rather 
than on a theory of comparable worth, was 
not a clearly delineated practice applied at 
a single point in the job selection process. 
The court noted that the decision to base 
compensation on the competitive market 
involves the assessment offactors too com-
plex and multifaceted for disparate impact 
analysis. Some of those factors included: 
surveys, hearings, administrative recom-
mendations, budget proposals, executive 
actions and legislative enactments. As a re-
sult there was no disparate impact found. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals overturned 
the district court's determination of dis-
parate treatment because it found that dis-
criminatory intent had not been proven. 
Although in appropriate cases discrimina-
tory intent may be inferred from circum-
stantial or direct evidence, the court held 
that the findings of "The Willis Study" 
alone, (that the state sets compensation at 
the market rate), would not establish the 
requisite intent without corroborating evi-
dence. The court stated that although the 
state participates in the market system, it 
did not create the market disparity and 
that setting pay rates according to the pre-
vailing market rate does not support the 
inference of intent to discriminate. The 
court noted that in some cases an inference 
of intent may be drawn from statistical evi-
dence, but the weight given to statistical 
evidence is determined by the existence of 
independent corroborative evidence of dis-
crimination such as testimony of specific 
incidents of discrimination. 
The court also rejected AFSCME's con-
tention that because the state commis-
sioned "The Willis Study", it was com-
mitted to implementing a new system of 
compensation based on comparable worth 
as defined in the study. The court was hes-
itant to adopt a rule that had the effect of 
penalizing rather than commending em-
ployers for their innovation in undertaking 
such a study. The court was also reluctant 
to bind the state to base its decision on 
the results of one study because different 
studies produce different results which the 
employer should be permitted to take into 
account when determining rate of pay. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals found neither dis-
parate impact nor disparate treatment. 
They held, therefore, that no Title VII 
violation had occurred. 
(AFSCME is currently petitioning the 
United States Supreme Court to hear this 
case.) 
-Audrey A. Creighton 
Hamilton v. State: JUDICIAL 
APPROVAL OF "JAIL HOUSE 
PLANTS" 
In Hamilton v. State, 62 Md. App. 603, 
490 A.2d 763 (1985), the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that a defen-
dant's statements to an acquaintance while 
both were incarcerated, did not amount to 
custodial interrogation requiring Miranda 
warnings even though the acquaintance 
carried on the conversation at the direction 
of the police. 
In the course of a murder investigation, 
the Maryland State Police became sus-
picious of the defendant, Raymond Ham-
ilton, who was incarcerated in the Mary-
land House of Correction in connection 
with an unrelated matter. At the behest of 
the State Police, an acquaintance of Ham-
ilton's, named Fowler, agreed to tape his 
conversation with the defendant in ex-
change for the authorities' consideration 
on pending charges. On two occasions, the 
acquaintance visited Hamilton and elicited 
from him incriminating statements regard-
ing the murder. These statements were 
made without the benefit of Miranda warn-
ings. The trial court denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress his statements, and as a 
result he was subsequently convicted of 
murder and various related offenses. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that 
the admission of the statements made to 
the acquaintance were in violation of his 
fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The court noted, as a pre-
liminary matter, that the admission of the 
taped conversations violated neither the 
Maryland nor federal wiretap statute. MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROe. CODE ANN. § 
1O-402(c)(2)(1984); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a)(c) 
(1982). Additionally, the court held that 
the admission of the tapes did not violate 
Hamilton's fourth amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
because "[t]he law gives no protection to 
the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice 
is or becomes a police agent .... " Hamil-
ton, 62 Md. App. at 608, 590 A.2d at 766 
(quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745,752 (1971». 
Turning to the defendant's fifth amend-
ment claim, Judge Alpert, writing for a 
unanimous court, stated that "Miranda 
warnings must be given when 'an individ-
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